Media in North Korea

North Korea's press includes the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Rodong Sinmun, Minju Choson and Chongnyon Jonwi. KCNA provides approved news for domestic media, while the Workers' Party of Korea and its Propaganda and Agitation Department control political content. The Korean Central Broadcasting Committee oversees broadcasting. KCTV, Mansudae TV, Ryongnamsan TV and Sports TV provide state television, and two national radio services plus the Third Radio Network carry national and local programming. Television sets are configured for state channels, and foreign broadcasts are jammed. KCTV commonly broadcasts from about 09:00 to 22:30, although schedules and reception vary. Kwangmyong is a state intranet used for research, education, news and domestic applications. It does not provide ordinary access to the global internet. Mobile data supports domestic calls, SMS, video calls and intranet services. A 2022 UN estimate placed mobile-phone ownership at roughly 50% to 80% of the population, while the ITU recorded 5.79 million active mobile-broadband subscriptions in 2024; neither figure demonstrates open internet access. Access is generally better in Pyongyang and other urban centres than in provinces and remote areas, and it also depends on electricity, equipment, income and institutional status. Manbang is a state IPTV service delivered through Kwangmyong. It offers live, catch-up and on-demand television, newspapers and teaching materials. Reports from 2025 described an offering of about 20 channels and possible round-the-clock availability, but subscription and equipment costs are not reliably published. Compatible equipment, network access and an active subscription are needed. Schools and universities also use Kwangmyong, electronic libraries, distance learning and Manbang educational materials. North Korea has no regulated equivalent of open social-media platforms with independent profiles, user moderation or unrestricted public networking. People may use state intranet applications, mobile calls and SMS, while informal offline networks also circulate information. Imported films, music and other media on USB or SD cards, hidden television or radio reception, and Chinese mobile networks near the border are reported, but these practices can expose individuals and their families to serious legal and security consequences. The constitution formally refers to freedom of the press and expression, but practical access is restricted by political controls and criminal law. The 2020 Law on Rejecting Reactionary Thought and Culture, the 2021 Youth Education Guarantee Law, the 2023 Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act and the 2023 revision of the Radio Wave Control Law impose severe restrictions on foreign media, language, devices and communications. Electronic devices such as smartphones and computers may be technically inspected and must generally be registered within ten days of purchase. Television and radio equipment is limited to authorized reception, and foreign radio or satellite networks require permission. Reported penalties range from fines and unpaid labour to labour education and more severe prosecution; UN reporting has described penalties reaching the death sentence for certain protected speech. Security bodies, the Office of the Prosecutor and Group 109 conduct inspections and raids, sometimes without advance notice or a court order. Domestic journalists work under party and state supervision, and deviation from the official line can lead to arrest, deportation or forced labour. Foreign agencies such as AFP and Kyodo operate under close monitoring. Independent media organizations, citizen journalism and free media advocacy have no reliable legal space. Formal complaints and petitions exist, but they do not provide dependable independent oversight of the media. Information from state sources therefore requires careful separation of official claims from independently reported evidence, although residents have very limited lawful access to external sources for comparison.